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Abstract: This paper studies the supply chain coordination with trade credit under
symmetric and asymmetric information, where the retailer has an individual profit
target from the business and the vendor is the decision-maker of the supply chain. We
propose a coordination mechanism through credit contract and show that a win-win
outcome is achieved by redistributing the cost savings from coordination mechanism
under certain constraints. Numerical examples are given to illustrate our results.
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1 Introduction
In the current competitive business environment, trade credit has been widely used and
represents an important proportion of firms finance. Rajan and Zingales reported that
accounts payable amounted to 15% of the assets for a sample of nonfinancial U.S. firms
on Global Vantage while debt in current liabilities accounted for just 7.4% [1]. In China,
it was once overused, e.g., powerful buyers like WalMart, Carrefour and Gome used to
allow delayed payments to their vendors for as long as one year, so that the government
has made a law to ban buyers from delaying payment for more than two months. Since
Goyal first developed an economic order quantity (EOQ) model under the conditions of
permissible delay in payments [2], there is a great deal of literature dealing with a variety
of situations such as shortages allowed, partial backlogging, credit-linked demand/order
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quantity, deterioration etc. Chung utilized the discounted cash-flows (DCF) approach to
analyze the optimal inventory policy in the presence of the trade credit [3]. Jamal et al.
extended Goyal’s model to consider the deteriorating items and to allow for shortages [4].
Teng amended Goyal’s model by considering the difference between unit price and unit
cost, then established an easy analytical closed-form to the problem [5]. Song and cai
studied the payment time of the retailer and the length of the inventory cycle under
permitted delay of payment by wholesaler and derived the optimal joint solution [6].
Chung and Huang extended Goyal’s model to the case that the units are replenished at
a finite rate [7]. Hu and Liu investigated retailers optimal replenishment policy under
conditions of permissible delay in payments and allowable shortages within the economic
production quantity (EPQ) framework [8]. Ouyang et al. developed an inventory model
with non-instantaneous receipt where the supplier provides not only a permissible delay
but also a cash discount for the retailer [9]. In [10], Ouyang et al. investigated a general-
ized inventory model for deteriorating items under the delay in payments linked to order
quantity. Liang and Zhou developed a two-warehouse inventory model for deteriorating
items under permissible delay in payment [11]. With purchasing cost depending on the
delay in payments and the order quantity, Krichen et al. proposed a solution approach
that generates stable coalition structures for the retailers [12]. Jaggi et al. investigated
the impact of credit-linked demand on the retailers optimal replenishment policy under
two levels of trade credit policy [13]. Annadurai and Uthayakumar further extended the
work of Jaggi et al. [13], by including deteriorating items and backlogging [14].
To the best of our knowledge, Jaber and Osman first used trade credit as a mechanism
to coordinate a two-level supply chain [15]. In [16], Sarmah et al. investigated a coor-
dination problem in a single-manufacturer and multiple heterogeneous buyers situation
with a credit option. Recently, Duan et al. studied the supply chain coordination policy
by delay in payments for the products with fixed lifetime [17]. However, information
asymmetry are not considered by the above-cited literature. Luo and Zhang studied the
benefit of coordinating a supply chain by a credit contract under both symmetric and
asymmetric information [18]. But in their analysis, the vendor gets all the cost savings
from the coordination regardless of the buyer’s benefits, and the supply chain cannot be
coordinated under asymmetric information. However, each member of a supply chain
wants a certain fixed amount of cost reduction from the business and hence parties will
not be interested in coordinating if their target profit is not achieved. In this paper,
we proposed a trade credit contract to coordinate the supply chain from the business
where both the parties have their cost targets. Considering credit policy as coordination
mechanism between the two parties, our objective is to derive the optimal credit periods
under symmetric and asymmetric information, respectively. In addition, we show that
using trade credit can coordinate the supply chain in cases with both the symmetric and
asymmetric information under some constraints.
2 Model formulation under symmetric information
2.1 Notation and assumptions
The following notations and assumptions are adopted throughout this paper.
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Notation
Sr retailer’s ordering cost per order
Sv vendor’s setup cost per production
D market demand rate
h retailer’s inventory holding cost per unit per unit time
Ir, Iv retailer’s and vendor’s unit capital opportunity
K integer lot size multiplier per cycle
M(K) the credit period offered by the vendor
Q order quantity of the buyer
Assumption 2.1 Demand rate is known and constant2.1.
Assumption 2.2 The vendor follows lot-for-lot manufacturing policy.
Assumption 2.3 Both production and replenishment is instantaneous.
Assumption 2.4 Shortages are not allowed.
2.2 The trade credit under full information
In the absence of any coordination, it is easy to obtain that the retailer’s optimal lot









Under the lot-for-lot system, the vendor’s cost including only the setup cost is TCv =
DSv
Qr














which is obvious larger than Qr. Hence, in order to entice the buyer to alter his current
EOQ by a factor K(K > 0), i.e., the retailer’s new ordering quantity is KQr, the
vendor offers a delay period M(K) (the delay period M is dependent on the retailer’s
order size) to the buyer to compensate the retailer for his increased inventory cost, and
possibly provides an additional saving, such that the vendor can benefit from higher
order quantity. It is assumed that the buyer is willing to coordinate as long as his
target cost is no larger than [1 − G(K)]TCr, where G(K)(> 0) is the reduction factor
of retailer’s target cost from supply chain coordination , such that the retailer can also
benefit from the supply chain coordination. For simplification, we assume that G(K) is
a linear function of K, i.e, G(K) = αK + β.
Under the above trade credit contract, the buyers inventory cost per unit time, de-
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−DIrM(K) 6 (1 − β − αK)TCr. (6)







+K − 2(1− β − αK)
]
. (7)
Next, we will determine the vendor and the buyers optimal lot size. From (5), we can
see that the vendor’s cost is minimized only if the trade credit gets the smallest value.
Hence, substituting M(K) = TCr2DIr
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+K − 2(1− β − αK)
]
. (8)
It is easy to verify that T̃Cv(Q,K) in (8) is convex in K, so the optimal value of K is


























Then Qc = K
∗Qr if α
∗ = Sv(Ir−Iv)2(Sr+Sv)Iv . Furthermore, from the perspective of vendor, it is















if supply chain coordination can be achieved, i.e., β > 1−
[
(1 + 2α∗)K∗ − SvIr2SrIv )
]
. Hence,






then the proposed trade credit contract can not only achieve the supply chain coordination
but achieve the win-win outcome for any given
β > 1−
[





In reality, according to the firm’s bargaining powers, the benefits allocation can be
achieved by changing β, e.g., a simple effective way to set the benefits allocated is to be
divided equitably between the two firms.
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3 Model formulation under asymmetric information
In this section, we consider the situation that the capital cost of the buyer is his private
information. Under asymmetric information, the vendor will offer a menu of contracts
for the sake of stimulating the buyer to reveal her information via contract selection.
This so-called screening game in the game theory, where the vendor is the first to move,
can be derived the optimal contract by using the approach developed in [19].
We assume that the vendor knows the random variable Ir characterized by a prior
distribution F (Ir) and the corresponding density function f(Ir) on its domain [Ir , Ir],
where 0 6 Ir < Ir < ∞. In the case of information asymmetry, the vendor now offers a
menu of contracts {K,M(K)}. Then the buyer choose a specific pair from the contract
menu, and the vendor can infer buyer’s Ir from his selection.
Based on the above arguments, we can present the vendor’s contract design problem
































−DwM(K) 6 (1− β − αK)TC0r , (12b)
Ir 6 Ir 6 Ir. (12c)
The constraint condition in (12a) indicates that the retailer will choose the optimal
contract menu to minimize his cost, and the constraint condition in (12b) requires that
the buyer’s cost with trade credit must be not higher than her reservation cost, for
ensuring his participation. TC0r is an exogenous variable that is retailer’s reservation
cost (e.g., it can be set as the retailer’s cost without coordination).
The following Proposition 2 gives the vendor’s optimal menu of credit contracts.
Proposition 3.1 When the retailer has the personal information about his capital
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Proof. Let U(Ir) =
DSr
KQr







































































′′ +DM ′ = 0. (20)
From (19) and (20), we obtain




Since the objective function T̃C
A
















the vendor’s expected cost is decreasing with U(Ir). Hence the condition U(Ir) = (1 −
β − αK)TC0r must be satisfied for any given K.



























f(Ir)dIr − (1− β)TC0r (23)
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s.t.




Ir 6 Ir 6 Ir. (23b)
Next, we first neglect the constraint conditions. Then the optimal contract must




















































2DSvIr + 2DSr[Iv − F (Ir)/f(Ir)]
h[Iv − F (Ir)/f(Ir)] + IrIv + 2αIrTC0r/Qr
. (26)






































When inequalities (28-29) are not fulfilled, K∗A does not satisfy the constraint in (23a)
and hence it is not the optimal solution of optimization problem (12). But we can easily







(see [18]), and hence the





h in this case.2











































for all Ir ∈ [Ir , Ir], then the






















A)) achieve chain coordination
between the retailer and the vendor.
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4 Numerical examples
In this section, we first study a full information case to examine the division of sur-
plus generated due to coordination. The basic parameters are set as follows: D =
1500units/year, Sv = 2000/order, Sr = 500/order, h = 10/unit/year.
Example 1. If Ir = 4 and Iv = 3, then by Proposition 1, (α
∗,K∗) = (0.13, 2.24). For
given β = 0.02, the retailer’s cost and the vendor’s cost are 3124.66 and 6366.41, i.e., an
decrease 46.66% and 43.96% from without coordination, respectively.
Example 2. If Ir = 5 and Iv = 8, then by Proposition 1, (α
∗,K∗) = (−0.15, 2.24).
For given β = 0.45, the retailer’s cost and the vendor’s cost are 4199.87 and 7705.19, i.e.,
an decrease 12.94% and 23.12% from without coordination, respectively.
Example 3. Assume that Iv = 2 and Ir ∼ U(2, 6) (uniformly distribution), then by
Proposition 2, the optimal value of K is K∗A =
√
1 + 0.1Ir and the corresponding credit




1 + 0.1Ir−0.34 for given Ir. Hence the vendor’s
cost is 6971.33 (set (α, β) = (0.05, 0.15) and TC0r = 3600). The costs for the vendor and
the retailer decrease 15.63% and 20.91% from without coordination, respectively.
Example 4. Assume that Iv = 10 and Ir ∼ U(3, 5), then by Proposition 2, the joint




A)), which is determined by (29-31), can coordination
the supply chain. For fixed β = 0.12 and TC0r = 4000, the costs for the vendor and the
retailer decrease 25.43% and 16.17% from without coordination, respectively.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, though credit contracts, we study the division of benefits sharing for
the supply chain coordination from the business under both symmetric and asymmetric
information. To some extent, the results of this paper may be applied to some practice
business. The wide usage of trade credit has shown that it can effectively reduce the
cost of supply chain members. In real practice, the trade credit policy may also be more
attractive than other policies like quantity discount to the retailer. In addition, by using
a quantity-dependent trade credit to entice the retailer to alter his order quantity, the
vendor can get much more benefits from the supply chain coordination, and the vendor
also prefers such a policy when he is financially strong.
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